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Pretrial Procedural Reform and
Jack Friedenthal
Mary Kay Kane*
What makes an influential procedure scholar? Acute powers of
analysis, the ability to see the broader implications of procedural
change, and the capacity to articulate clearly and concisely what is at
stake are, of course, all critical qualities. But there is an additional
contributing factor. It may best be described as someone who be-
comes intellectually intrigued with an area of procedure that ulti-
mately evolves into one that is central to achieving our objectives of
according fairness and justice through the adversary system. It is ex-
actly that combination of skills and interest that mark Jack
Friedenthal's scholarly contributions throughout his academic career.
When asked to write an essay reflecting on some aspect of Jack
Friedenthal's contributions over his remarkable, fifty-year academic
career, I, of course, first thought about the long-time and important
influence he has had on legal education and on generations of law
students through his co-authored, widely adopted casebook on civil
procedure, which was first published in 1968.1 But then I began to
think about what procedural reforms had taken place during his aca-
demic career and how he, as a scholar, had contributed to them and,
most importantly, had helped others understand them.
Throughout Jack Friedenthal's career, a primary area of civil pro-
cedure reform has been in the area of the pretrial phase of litigation.
The attention paid to pretrial procedure reflects, in part, the reality
that most cases settle. But it also reflects the increasing docket pres-
sure on courts, which has led to considerable emphasis on providing
the courts with the appropriate tools to manage their cases efficiently
and fairly, and to curb abuses that appear to prevent that from hap-
pening. In some instances, these reforms have created a "sea change"
in the way that certain pretrial procedures are applied; in others, pro-
cedural rules have been amended to meet new challenges or to make
* Distinguished Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Hastings College of
Law.
1 Originally co-authored with Arthur Miller and Jack Cound, the casebook is currently in
its tenth edition and has as additional authors, John Sexton and Helen Hershkoff. See JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, JOHN E. SEXTON & HELEN HERSHKOFF, CIVIL PROCE-
DURE: CASES AND MATERIALS (10th ed. 2009).
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available new tools to handle litigation that itself has changed dramat-
ically since the rules were adopted in 1938. A brief review of some of
the changes that have occurred reveals the massive scope of the re-
forms that have taken place in the pretrial process over the years and
that are covered by the body of work that constitutes Jack
Friedenthal's scholarship. 2
One of the first major pretrial procedural changes to note is the
amendment of the discovery rules in 1970. These amendments fol-
lowed a comprehensive review of the operation of the discovery rules
begun by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in 1963. As a result
of that review, the entire discovery system was redesigned to try to
allow it to operate extrajudicially-directly between the parties with-
out needing court orders to facilitate the exchange of information.
The 1970 amendments came about as a result of several studies that
determined that the prior discovery approach, which required court
orders for all requests, was wasteful because most often those orders
were granted.3 Thus, the idea was that the parties should come to
court only when there was some disputed discovery request. This was
a sea change to the way in which discovery had operated.
Unfortunately, in the years following the 1970 amendments, it be-
came clear that the discovery phase of litigation was one of the most
costly litigation elements. In addition, it frequently was identified as a
(if not the) major cause of litigation delay. This then led to a series of
amendments to the discovery rules to try to better calibrate the system
and stem abuses.
In fact, the discovery rules have been amended nine times since
19704 and there is yet another amendment being proposed in 2010.
2 Federal pretrial procedure has not been the only area of Jack Friedenthal's scholarship,
which also includes topics such as procedural issues in California state procedure and evidence.
See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, Joinder of Claims, Counterclaims, and Cross-Complaints: Suggested
Revision of the California Provisions, 23 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1970); Jack H. Friedenthal & W.
Daniel Shieh, The Value of an Initial Look at Counterintuitive Evidence Rules, 50 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 1039 (2006).
3 For a discussion of the empirical bases on which the amendments were made, see 8
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2001 (2d ed. 1994).
4 Three of the discovery amendments were nonsubstantive and were part of broader
changes being made to the civil rules generally. These were: (1) in 1987, as part of the amend-
ment of all the rules to make them gender neutral; (2) in 2007, as part of the restyling of all the
civil rules; and (3) in 2009, as part of a time-computation project to adopt a uniform system for
time calculation in all the rules. On occasion, other amendments were directed to specific rules
and specific questions posed by them. I am only discussing in text the broader changes that were
designed to reflect general litigation concerns and practices, but the sheer number and compli-
2009]
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This section of the federal rules thus has undergone a record number
of changes in the past nearly forty years 5 indicating both the impor-
tant role that discovery plays in litigation, as well as the difficulties
encountered when trying to solve the problems discovery poses. For
purposes of this Essay, in particular, it is worth noting five of the
amendments that were made because they reveal the kind of major
changes that occurred through the years.
In 1980, an amendment introduced the use of a discovery confer-
ence, confirming the power of the court to control discovery by di-
recting the parties to appear before the judge to discuss it.6 In 1983, a
series of amendments to Rule 26 attempted to discourage redundant
and non-cost-effective discovery. These included placing a duty on
the court to monitor the overuse of discovery7 and adding a signature
requirement obligating lawyers to attest that their requests or re-
sponses are proper and not unreasonable, with the court being given
sanctioning power if it finds a violation.8
In an effort to accelerate the exchange of basic information about
a case, a new disclosure requirement was included in Rule 26(a) in
1993, although courts could opt out of this system by local rule. The
imposition of a disclosure requirement reflected a new philosophy.
Instead of the traditional discovery philosophy by which litigants at-
tempt to discover evidence from their opponent and the party seeking
evidence controls the process, litigants under this approach have an
obligation to disclose all relevant information of which they are aware
so that it is the evidence-possessor who has principal control over the
process. The amended rule combined both traditional discovery with
disclosure methods by requiring the exchange of certain evidence at
the outset of the litigation, supplementing that initial disclosure by
later traditional discovery.
In 2000, there were additional amendments to the disclosure pro-
visions, making disclosure mandatory and removing the local rule opt-
cated nature of all these amendments were especially challenging for scholars, like Jack
Friedenthal, whose writing included the functioning of the discovery process.
5 In contrast, it is interesting to note that the class-action rule, Rule 23, which also is
recognized as having an extremely important impact on litigation, as well as being the source of
many problems, has been amended only five times since its major revision in 1966, and three of
those times were not addressing particular class-action issues, but as part of more general
changes being made to the civil rules. See supra note 4. Substantive amendments were made
only in 1998 and 2003.
6 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
7 Id. 26(b)(2).
8 Id. 26(g). A signature requirement was also part of the changes made to the pleading
rules to attempt to curb abuses there. See infra text accompanying notes 12-18.
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out authority. The amendments also narrowed the scope of document
disclosure to only those documents "in support of" the case, rather
than merely "relevant" to the case. Indeed, the amendments gener-
ally narrowed the scope of discovery to authorize requests for infor-
mation "relevant to any party's claim or defense" and to require a
court order for broader discovery related to the general subject matter
of the action.9 Finally, the Rule 26(f) discovery conference became
mandatory, rather than optional. The last amendments to note oc-
curred in 2006, when the discovery rules were amended to insert refer-
ences to the discovery of electronic information in recognition of the
explosion of that form of information in the modern world and to
make clear that it was covered in the rules.
In addition to, and sometimes in conjunction with, all of these
changes to the discovery rules, numerous amendments have been
made to Rule 16, which as originally adopted focused primarily on
authorizing a pretrial conference. That rule was totally rewritten in
1983 to provide the courts guidance regarding pretrial management
and scheduling in order to better move cases along. These changes
effected a shift into a new era of serious judicial management, rather
than allowing the parties to control the pacing of the litigation. As
additional areas have emerged that should properly be addressed in
the pretrial stage and as a means of further encouraging judicial man-
agement of the discovery process, Rule 16 also has been amended sev-
eral times to clarify the court's authority to do so.
Illustrative of the scope of these changes, the rule now contains
detailed directions on scheduling, a concept not found in the original
rule. These require, in most instances, that the court issue a schedul-
ing order covering a wide array of items.10 Additionally, in the Rule
16 provisions concerning the matters to be considered at a pretrial
conference, the subjects now listed number sixteen," rather than the
six items that were found in the original 1938 rule. All of this, again,
simply suggests both the importance of this phase of the litigation and
the considerable changes that have occurred as the rulemakers have
struggled with how to improve it.
Rule amendments to encourage better or more careful investiga-
tion before filing a claim or defense also were made during this same
period. These took the form of amending Rule 11, which since its
adoption in 1938 has contained a requirement that all pleadings must
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be signed by the attorney filing them. The purpose of the requirement
is to ensure truthfulness in pleading as well as to deter frivolous claims
and defenses. In 1983, it was recognized that this requirement effec-
tively was unenforceable under the standard of the existing rule,12 and
the sanctioning power-to strike or dismiss a defective pleading-was
so draconian that it seldom was utilized.13 Thus, significant revisions
were made to clarify that the signer must not only have read the
pleading and be acting in good faith but also must certify that the
pleading was being filed only after a reasonable inquiry into the facts
and law suggested that the pleading was well-grounded. The amend-
ment also expanded the array of available sanctions and made sanc-
tions mandatory upon finding a violation.
After only ten years' experience under this version of the rule,
problems surfaced resulting in another set of substantial amendments
in 1993. These amendments changed the standard again as to what is
being certified by the attorney's signature; 14 provided a safe-harbor
for pleaders, by requiring a party seeking sanctions for the rule's vio-
lation to notify the alleged offender who then has twenty-one days
during which the challenged pleading can be withdrawn or amended
without risk of penalty; 5 and clarified that the purpose of sanctions
under the rule is to deter improper conduct, not to compensate the
opponent.
1 6
The preceding description of these changes to Rule 11 is far from
comprehensive1 7 since my purpose here is not to create a detailed his-
tory of rule changes. Rather, the key point to be made is to recognize
some of the major shifts in practice that have taken place in this im-
portant element of pretrial procedure. And controversy continues as
to whether the approach taken in the 1993 rule, which somewhat re-
laxed the stringent requirements of its 1983 predecessor, is appropri-
ately calibrated to avoid chilling innovative claims and defenses and to
decrease satellite litigation over sanctions, while at the same time de-
12 The original rule provided that the attorney's signature certified that the attorney had
read the pleading, believed there were good grounds to support it, and had not interposed the
pleading to delay the case. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938) (amended 1983).
13 For a history of Rule 11 prior to 1983, see 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1331 (3d ed. 2004).
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
15 Id. 11(c)(2).
16 Id. 11(c)(4).
17 For a more detailed description of what the amendment included, see the Advisory
Committee Note to the 1993 amendment to Federal Rule 11. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory com-
mittee's note.
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terring frivolous litigation and encouraging adequate pretrial
preparation. 8
Important changes in pretrial litigation procedure have not been
limited to rule amendments. They also came about during these same
decades as a result of the adoption by the Supreme Court of newly
articulated standards governing both the granting of summary judg-
ment and the pleading of a sufficient claim for relief.
In a trilogy of summary judgment opinions in 1986, the Supreme
Court rearticulated the burden placed on the parties for purposes of
determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that
should prevent the granting of summary judgment. 19 In doing so, the
Court lessened the initial burden on the moving party by allowing the
movant either to affirmatively negate the opponent's claim by intro-
ducing evidence or, without introducing any evidence, to demonstrate
that the nonmoving party is unable to prove an essential element of
the claim.20 It also heightened the burden placed on the party oppos-
ing summary judgment, requiring the nonmovant to produce evidence
sufficient to withstand a directed verdict motion under the evidentiary
standard applicable at trial, even if that is higher than the typical pre-
ponderance-of-the-evidence standard.21 And when competing eviden-
tiary inferences are presented, the Court ruled that summary
judgment can be granted if one of the inferences is more plausible
than the other; summary judgment can be denied only if the court is
confronted by two equally plausible inferences. 22 The combination of
these three rulings clearly indicated the Supreme Court's interest in
making it easier to obtain summary judgment.
Even more recently, the Court, in 2007, abandoned the approach
commonly used by lower courts in evaluating what is sufficient to
withstand a pleading dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). That approach
had been taken from language in the Supreme Court's 1957 decision
in Conley v. Gibson,23 stating that a claim should not be dismissed
"unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
18 For a discussion of the criticisms of both the 1983 and 1993 amendments, see 5A
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, at § 1322.
19 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
20 Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325 ("[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by
'showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to
support the nonmoving party's case.").
21 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57.
22 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 596-97.
23 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
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facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. ' 24 The
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly characterized that phrase,
which had been invoked by thousands of lower-court opinions
through the years, as "best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss
on an accepted pleading standard. '25 It then went on to rule that the
appropriate standard to be applied was whether the pleader has set
out "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. ' 26 Thus, a new "plausibility" standard was adopted with a clear
need for the claimant to assert facts to state a claim for relief in order
to meet that standard, in contrast to merely giving generalized notice
to the opposing party of the claim involved. 27
It is against this brief summary of developments in federal pre-
trial procedure during the last several decades that I want to evaluate
Jack Friedenthal's scholarly contributions. The first thing worth not-
ing is that he demonstrated his interest in and ability to help think
seriously about the pretrial litigation phase in one of his very first arti-
cles, which appeared in 1962 and which focused on expert discovery.28
With that early start, Jack Friedenthal identified the pretrial phase of
civil litigation as a special area of his expertise. His many scholarly
contributions over his fifty year academic career have placed him in
the center of grappling with the numerous major changes just
sketched. Not only has he suggested solutions to procedural problems
confronted by the courts, but he has been a master at explaining some
of the nuances and implications of various rule changes and the Su-
preme Court's development of new procedural standards.
While a scan of his bibliography will reveal numerous entries cov-
ering the pretrial areas just described, 29 in particular I would note that
24 Id. at 45.
25 Bell Ati. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1969 (2007).
26 Id. at 1974.
27 Twombly itself was an antitrust case and several lower courts initially indicated that its
heightened pleading standards might apply only in the complex business litigation setting. In
2009, however, in a suit alleging various constitutional rights violations, the Court affirmed that
the Twombly standard applies to all civil actions, not solely antitrust cases. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
28 Jack H. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14
STAN. L. REV. 445 (1962).
29 See, e.g., Jack H. Friedenthal, Judicial Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment in the Era
of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91 (2002); Jack H. Friedenthal. Secrecy in Civil
Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 67 (2000); Jack H. Friedenthal, Cases
on Summary Judgment: Has There Been a Material Change in Standards?, 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 770 (1988); Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CAL. L. REV. 806 (1981); Jack H. Friedenthal, Herbert
v. Lando: A Note on Discovery, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1059 (1979).
[Vol. 78:30
HeinOnline  -- 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 36 2009-2010
Pretrial Procedural Reform
as a co-author for our Hornbook on Civil Procedure, which is now in
its fourth edition,30 Jack is the author who contributes the chapters on
Pleading, Discovery, The Pretrial Conference, and Adjudication With-
out Trial (which includes, of course, summary judgment).31 Thus, he
has had the laboring oar over the years at explaining the myriad large
and small changes just briefly described, their implications, and the
history and concerns that surround them. In the last twenty years
when pretrial procedural reform has seemed almost constant, it is
amazing that he has had time to do anything else!
In my view, although the body of Jack Friedenthal's scholarship is
worthy of praise, his work on our Hornbook, alone, would entitle him
to high accolades. It represents an incredible contribution to genera-
tions of students and lawyers. 32 The reasons why it is such a significant
contribution are because he has a superb ability to keep on top of an
amazing amount of detail33 and to present it clearly, always with an
understanding of the broader context in which procedural change has
taken place. Whether it is taking abstract, theoretically complicated
concepts (like shifting burdens of proof on summary judgment34) and
stating them clearly and concisely, or walking through detailed rule
requirements and describing them in a way that creates an under-
standing of the "bigger picture" and the objectives involved, thereby
making them make sense 35 Jack Friedenthal is a master. I am
honored to be one of his co-authors because it has allowed me to work
closely with a truly first-rate lawyer and scholar. He is a legal gem
who well deserves this law review celebration of his career.
I close noting that his work is not yet over and we need to con-
tinue to receive his wise insights! First, there are pending 2010
30 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE:
HORNBOOK SERIES (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter "HORNBOOK"].
31 Id. at chs. 5-6, 8-9. He also is responsible for the chapter on the Trial Process, including
the explanation of the Rules of Evidence, which is another of his fields of expertise. Id. at ch. 10.
32 The analytical ability and clarity of exposition that mark his HORNBOOK contributions
are ones that also necessarily would come to the forefront in the classroom, so I can only envy
the thousands of students who have had the opportunity to have him as their procedure teacher
over the past fifty years.
33 Not only are the changes in federal procedure that are briefly described in this Essay
included in the Hornbook, but state procedure is covered as well. Thus, it is necessary for him to
track which states follow the federal lead in these complicated areas and to explain other ap-
proaches that the states may be taking.
34 HoRNBOOK. supra note 30, at § 9.3. In fact, my earlier description of the Supreme
Court's 1986 rulings in summary judgment, see supra text accompanying notes 19-22, is largely
drawn from his concise statement of the impact of those cases in that section.
35 See, e.g., HORNBOOK, supra note 30, at § 5.11 (discussing the Rule 11 standards and
amendments).
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amendments proposing changes to the handling of expert witnesses. 36
(Perhaps, if we are lucky, these may encourage him to return to his
first civil procedure article topic with the wisdom provided by almost
fifty years' experience.) But, more generally, serious consideration is
being given in the United States Judicial Conference committees as to
whether we should totally rethink the current approach taken by the
civil rules to litigation. A 2010 invitational conference is being organ-
ized by the Civil Rules Advisory Committee at the behest of the
Standing Committee on Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Judicial
Conference to begin thinking about the fundamental litigation
problems of today, how well the current rules address them, and
whether substantial change is needed. Areas to be explored at the
conference include pleading, the discovery process, and dispositive
motions. Thus, with possible significant changes in pretrial procedure
under discussion again, it is clear that the thoughtful insights of Jack
Friedenthal will be needed to help yet another generation of
rulemakers and reformers. So, despite earning a well-deserved respite
after fifty years of toiling in the civil procedure vineyards, I am afraid
Jack Friedenthal's work is not yet done as a whole new series of re-
forms will need dissecting.
36 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (Preliminary Draft of proposed amendments, August
2008). After the comment period ended, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules revised that
proposal in small ways. The proposal was then approved by the Committee on Practice and
Procedure of the U.S. Judicial Conference and, in September 2009, it was submitted to the Con-
ference, which has recommended it to the Supreme Court for adoption in 2010.
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